Introduction(Extract)
It is indisputable that there is much wrong with the world today. Many people of good will think the problems are basically political and economic, but both of us believe that the politics
and economics are embedded in a conceptual framework of moralities grounded in one type of foundational individualism or another, none of which are even capable of addressing those problems any
longer, much less contribute to their solutions. Thus we believe that new moralities are needed (containing some very old elements), with intellectual and psychological resources that more
closely resemble the hopes, fears, dreams and aspirations of actual people than the deracinated individuals who currently populate our patterns of moral thinking. For us, a role ethics largely
inspired by the canons of classical Confucian philosophy, suitably modified for our modern sensibilities, presents one such conceptual framework for grounding a morality appropriate for the
present day. And more than that, such a role ethic can appeal to what are referred to as liberals and conservatives alike, with room as well for both the faithful and the skeptics, proffering
as it does a vision of the good life for human beings that can provide useful guidelines for addressing our political, economic, environmental – and perhaps even spiritual – problems, in a more
cooperative manner, without any necessary theological grounding.
That we are all social creatures, strongly influenced by the others with whom we interact, has been acknowledged broadly by philosophers of all persuasions. But within our classical and
modern discourse, there are reasons why this social dimension has been marginalized and rarely seen as being of the essence of our humanity at the moral and political (and ontological) level.
On this view, our social selves cannot be of compelling worth because our concrete circumstances are in an important sense accidental in that we have exercised no control over them – that is,
we are not responsible for who our parents are, the native languages we speak, our ethnicity, and so forth. Consequently, what does give human beings their primary worth, their dignity, their
integrity, and their value – and what must command the respect of all – is their ability to act purposively and to exercise their capacity for self-determination, that is, their autonomy. And
of course, in order for human beings to be truly autonomous, they must neither be coerced nor governed by instinct or passion. That is, they must be free and rational in the choices that they
make. But this view of human beings is not the only one that can accord dignity and respect to everyone.
The Genesis of Confucian Role Ethics
We both came to Confucian role ethics as an alternative to autonomous individualism through our study of classical Confucian texts, and then later when we worked closely together over a
number of years on Confucian translation and interpretation projects. The concept of role ethics had its genesis in a paper Rosemont wrote in 1991 for a Festschrift in honor of Herbert
Fingarette wherein he suggested that seeing the Chinese as flesh and blood role-bearers rather than potential candidates to be abstract rights-holders might give Western-trained philosophers a
better background for reading early Confucian texts. Ames then began to work with the idea for developing an ethics of roles in some depth, contextualizing it within the centrality of family as
the governing metaphor in Chinese culture. Rosemont then picked up on Ames’s discussions of family in his search for an appropriate English vocabulary to describe such a morality since it was
without counterpart in the history of Western ethics. And Rosemont further addressed his cudgel to retrofit the Chinese lexicon and thereby allow the early Confucians to speak more clearly and
faithfully in their own voices while at the same time expressing views applicable to our present conditions. Ames developed the notion of paranomasia to explain how the Chinese lexicon makes
its meaning, and Rosemont moved from thinking of concepts and words to think more of concept-clusters, especially, but not confined to terms central for philosophers, especially as they are
seen as definitive of ethics, politics and religion. It is largely against this background of the three shared interrelated themes – role ethics, family, and language/translation – that our
collaborative efforts are best understood: two textual translations (the Analects of Confucius and the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence), our joint articles, and two separately authored
books, Ames’s Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (2011) and Rosemont’s Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family and Religion (2015).
At first we attempted to articulate Confucian role ethics somewhat unreflectively in terms that could conceivably be descriptive of free, autonomous individual selves as well as role-bearers
– even though we became increasingly suspicious of the former – especially as we embarked upon our translation of the Analects. Our suspicions were confirmed fairly quickly after we began the
work, encountering two major difficulties: (1) while passages in the text pertaining to the conduct of human beings as role-bearers abound, we could find none that describe the activities of
these role-bearing persons in terms of freedom or autonomy, and very few in which any of the participants are not discussed in terms of close relationships to others; and (2) as we continued to
think about and develop the notion of role ethics, and began to speak of human “beings” as always “becoming,” we found less work for the concept of the free, autonomous, and rationally choosing
individual self to do, or even to be. Instead, it increasingly seemed to us that describing the proper performances of persons in their various roles and the appropriate attitude expressed in
such roles in their relationship to others with whom they are engaged, sufficed to articulate an ethics that seemed both to give the greatest consistency and coherence to the text, and also to
conform to our own everyday experience much better than those abstract accounts reflected in the writings of the heroes of Western moral philosophy, past and present.
By the time we came to translate the Chinese Classic of Family Reverence, we were willing to jettison the concept of the free and autonomous individual altogether for several reasons. First,
we became increasingly puzzled when trying to make clear sense of what it would mean to be a free and autonomous individual self – apart from the habits of an old psychology – supported in our
growing doubts by much recent work in the neurosciences and social psychology, as well as in philosophy. Second, we were able to begin work with both the Chinese and English languages to try to
capture the vision of Confucius as we saw it without doing violence to the text, and to explicate more generally what an ethics of roles might be like.
Third, we came to the philosophical position, and began arguing for the idea that an insistence on the paramouncy of individual freedom in ethical and political theories – and instantiated in
democratic societies – was purchased at the expense of equality and social justice, as libertarians have been (unintentionally) making increasingly clear, especially in the U.S. Consequently,
we found that all moral arguments for equality and social justice grounded in the concept of individual freedom could be met by counter arguments equally moral. Moreover, although our
interpreting the Analects as a role ethics met with some initial skepticism, we have not been persuaded by any of the critiques of what might be wrong with our translations of the text or our
interpretations of it, and that has held for our Chinese Classic of Family Reverence efforts as well. Further, if we are correct in our claim that championing the freedom and autonomy of
individuals has come at the expense of social justice, then clearly we would not be doing the early Confucians any favors by attributing a concept of autonomous individualism to them.
And finally, a fourth reason for abandoning the fiction of the autonomous individual is that it seemed increasingly to be the case that all of the important good work done by deontological,
consequentialist, or virtue ethics based on individualism could also be captured by an ethics of roles, and hence Confucius did not have to be seen as a marginal, second-class moral
philosopher. The concept of human beings as free, autonomous individuals could thus be dispensed with by one pass of Ockham’s razor.
Believing that every society worth living in must be characterized by a robust sense of social justice and a fair measure of economic equality, we have thus been led in recent work to abandon
altogether every ethical theory grounded in what we have come to call a default “foundational individualism” that would include care ethics, Marxism, and the communal anarchism of Peter
Kropotkin no less than the strictly individualist version of Max Stirner, and almost all other philosophers in between, otherwise as disparate as Rousseau, Rawls, Sandel, Mac-Intyre, Susan
Okin, and Charles Taylor. If we are correct that all ethics and politics grounded in the freedom and autonomy of individuals hinders significantly the achievement of social justice in a
society, and if many of the horrors confronting the world today have the social injustices of poverty and inequality as their root cause, then, to repeat, it becomes clear to us that we do no
favors to the early Confucians to ascribe to them an individualist foundation to their thinking, for they then can have little to say about solving contemporary world problems, and we would be
reduced to reading the Analects for its antiquarian interest.
We may be wrong in some or all of these beliefs. It may be the case that there is an ethics and politics grounded in individualism that can indeed claim the moral high ground for social
justice and wealth redistribution, and we would urge those colleagues so persuaded to continue to attempt to develop their ideas. But because we believe that foundational individualism is a
major cause of our contemporary malaise we are not optimistic that any theory accepting it can contribute to its cure; thus far we have not seen any plausible candidates, and until we do, we
will continue to push the envelope for an ethics and politics grounded in the roles lived by interrelated persons, whose sole constant is change.
Why not Autonomous Individualism?
The need for us to pursue what we might alternatively call a narrative notion of person arises from the fact that the concept of the autonomous individual underlying modern moral and
political philosophy has come to have at least four pernicious effects. First, it enables libertarian capitalists, growing in their numbers in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, to claim moral
purchase in justifying an unfettered human freedom as the basis and ultimate source of political justice, and on that basis, to then reject any conception of justice that retards such freedom
as fundamentally immoral. The notion of the individual so defined thus continues to provide a moral basis for a more or less laissez-faire global free market capitalist economy that is
compounding exponentially the gross inequities in human well-being within, between, and beyond modern nation states. And as long as the conservatives, liberals, communitarians, and socialists
alike all continue to ground their objections to libertarianism in their own version of the same autonomous individual, the libertarian will always be able to counter their challenges and
remain above moral reproach.
The second related reason that the concept of the autonomous individual is pernicious is its monopoly on the consciousness of Western intellectuals. The foundational individual is entrenched
at a depth that makes it almost impossible for us to see any alternative to an individualism so defined except that of a more or less faceless collectivism in a decidedly post-Marxist era. It
has become extraordinarily difficult within our political and ethical discourse to view human beings (including ourselves, of course) in any way other than as free, autonomous, and rational
(and usually self-interested) individuals, making it equally difficult to act on any other basis. Indeed, the assumption that the essential characteristics and actions of human beings are best
understood by regarding them as fundamentally free, autonomous, and rational individuals has in the sense of brooking no alternatives, become a default, uncritical ideology. And from this
ideological perspective, social relations and actions will be seen as justifiable – that is, as being just – only to the extent that they are agreed to by individuals so described.
Thus, within this ideology, community is not the natural state of and for human beings, but only the artificial construct of otherwise discrete individuals. And again within this
contractarian ideology, while procedure and retribution play a dominant if not definitive role in our regnant conceptions of justice, any effort to pursue social justice that challenges
personal autonomy becomes contentiously dismissed as European “socialism,” and any gesture made in the direction of restorative justice will likely be perceived as undeserving of such a
description. And so long as this ideology of the individual holds us in its orbit, it will be impossible to be objective or impartial in evaluating any conception of justice or of any notion of
the human being that underlies such a concept of justice that has the temerity to take issue with autonomous individualism.
A third corollary of foundational individualism is that ironically, it does not make good on its promises. Stated simply, acting to advance one’s own selfinterest at the expense of others
seldom serves those same interests, and acting altruistically to serve the interests of others at one’s own expense in the end gives the other very little. Drinking a fine bottle of wine by
oneself is not as enjoyable as sharing it with good friends, and to the extent the self-abnegation is entailed by altruism, the “other” receives only diminishing returns. We will see in a
Confucian conception of the relationally constituted conception of a person, a good teacher and a good student can only emerge together, and your welfare and the welfare of you neighbor are
coterminous and mutually entailing. The fourth pernicious effect of an entrenched individualism and perhaps its most visible detriment is that there is an aura of the self-fulfilling prophecy
that haloes this ideology: The more we have come to see ourselves as autonomous individuals contracting with others in service to our own self-interests, the more we have come to act as, and
ultimately, to become just such individuals. The degree of angst, alienation, and violence that has become characteristic of contemporary urban living is a direct consequence of our
dysfunctional families and our failure to transform mere associated living into communities of shared values and interests.
Why Confucian Role Ethics?
The starting point is simple. In Confucian role ethics, association is a fact. We do not live our lives inside our skins. Everything we do – physically, psychologically, socially – is
resolutely transactional and collaborative. And the roles we live are simply the way in which this fact of association is further stipulated and specified. Confucian role ethics appeals to
specific roles for stipulating the forms that association take within lives lived in family and community – that is, the various roles we live as sons and teachers, grandmothers and neighbors.
For Confucianism, not only are these roles descriptive of our associations, but once stipulated, they are also prescriptive in the sense that roles in family and community are themselves
normative, guiding us in the direction of appropriate conduct. One is a good or bad spouse, and a good or bad teacher. Whereas mere association is a given, flourishing families and communities
are what we are able to make of this associative condition as the highest human achievement.
Confucian role ethics has a holistic and compelling vision of the moral life that is grounded in and is responsible to our empirical experience. First, Confucian role ethics would insist on
the primacy of vital relationships, and would preclude any notion of final individuality. Personal discreteness is a conceptual abstraction and strict autonomy a misleading fiction; association
is a fact. And giving up the notion of a superordinate “self,” far from surrendering one’s personal uniqueness, in fact, nhances it. That is, the “natural kinds” talk that usually stands behind
claims about a shared human nature and a concomitant essential self mitigates the degree of difference we find in a Confucian notion of person where person is constituted by a dynamic manifold
of always specific relations.
Secondly, Confucian role ethics resists the uncritical substance ontology underlying a conception of agency that requires a separation between the agent of conduct and the conduct itself. The
notion of ren仁that is central to Confucian role ethics entails no such agency/action dichotomy. Ren requires a narrative rather than an analytic understanding of person. And ren is cultivated
by correlating one’s own conduct with those models close at hand rather than by acting in concert with some abstract moral principles. It is for this reason that it is often unclear whether ren
denotes a consummate person or the conduct of such a person, or like its cognate ren人, whether the referent is singular or plural. Ren is an open-ended generalization made off of particular
historical accomplishments of consummate conduct rather than referencing some innate and essential element that is characteristic of all members of the set called human “beings.” Indeed, ren is
a gerundive notion – a verbal noun – that is descriptive of consummate “person-ing.”
Thirdly, Confucian role ethicists appreciate the dramatic role that body has as integral to achieving personal identity and consummate conduct – the body as the root or trunk through which
human conduct, being nourished and grown, becomes refulgent. It is no coincidence that the simplified graph for body體is体 – that is, quite literally, the graphic denotation of the root and stem
of a person. The body – always a collaboration between person and world, between organism and environment – is at once carnal and vital, seen and lived, receptive and responsive. Not only does
the world shape the body, but through our bodily sensorium we structure, conceptualize, and theorize our world of experience. Indeed, it is because the body is the medium through which our
ancestors and their culture live on in us that keeping one’s body intact has been the first among the several precepts of family reverence (xiao 孝).
Fourthly, Confucian role ethics emphasizes the vital role that the process of moral imagination plays in consummate thinking and living. In Confucian role ethics, it is our educated
imagination that, drawing upon all of our human resources, defers action until we can conjure forth the full range of possibilities that allows for optimal growth in our relationships. And said
plainly, it is this growth in relationships that is the very substance of morality.
And finally, Confucian role ethics does not compete with virtue ethics or any other ethical theory but is rather a vision of the moral life that resists the theoretical/practical divide. When
we read the Confucian canons, the expectation is that while we certainly can appropriate a cluster of terms that enable a critical reflection on our conduct, we ought, more fundamentally, to be
inspired by the exhortations and the models of the cultural heroes to become better people.
