Necessary Beings is concerned with two central areas of metaphysics: modality--the theory of necessity, possibility, and other related notions; and ontology--the general study of what
kinds of entities there are. Bob Hale’s overarching purpose is to develop and defend two quite general theses about what is required for the existence of entities of various kinds: that
questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood or adequately answered without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity, and that, conversely,
questions about the nature and basis of necessity and possibility cannot be satisfactorily tackled without drawing on what might be called the methodology of ontology. Taken together, these two
theses claim that ontology and modality are mutually dependent upon one another, neither more fundamental than the other.
Hale defends a broadly Fregean approach to metaphysics, according to which ontological distinctions among different kinds of things (objects, properties, and relations) are to be drawn on the
basis of prior distinctions between different logical types of expression. The claim that facts about what kinds of things exist depend upon facts about what is possible makes little sense
unless one accepts that at least some modal facts are fundamental, and not reducible to facts of some other, non-modal, sort. He argues that facts about what is absolutely necessary or possible
have this character, and that they have their source or basis, not in meanings or concepts nor in facts about alternative ’worlds’, but in the natures or essences of things.
