The Ethics and Law of Omissions

This volume explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissive conduct. Many of this book’s contributors try to make sense of the possibility of moral responsibility for omissions, including those that occur unwittingly. The disagreements among them concern the grounds of moral responsibility in these cases: the constellation of states and traits that constitute the self, or the quality of one’s will, or exercises of evaluative judgment, or the ability and opportunity to avoid the omission, or the tracing back to a time when one had the witting ability to take steps to avoid future omission. Some contributors consider whether omissions need to be under one’s control if one is to be morally responsible for them, as well as which sense of ＂control＂ is relevant, if it is, to the question of moral responsibility. Yet others consider whether it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for an omission that she could not have avoided. On the legal side, the volume also considers various issues concerning the status of omissions in the law: whether circumstances that are usually described as involving legal liability for omissions are better described as involving legal liability for entire courses of conduct; the conditions (such as creation of the peril) under which one can be legally liable for an omission to rescue; why a defendant’s legal guilt for a crime can be predicated on an omission to act only if the defendant was under a legal duty to engage in the omitted act; and whether this ＂duty requirement＂ is grounded in the desirability of shielding from legal liability those who are not criminally culpable or in the constraint that one’s body and property may not be appropriated for the general good.